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Rahmi Sahindal, a Kurdish man who migrated from Turkey to Sweden in 1980, killed his daughter Fadime in the city of Uppsala on 
21 January 2002. Rahmi and his son, Mesud, felt that Fadime had shamed the family by rejecting an arranged marriage, and by feeling 
free to love a partner of her choice, a Swedish man. She had, according to tradition, violated the codes of honour "namus." She had 
further "shamed" her father and brother by resisting their death threats, going public about their intentions, taking them to court, and 
by launching a campaign against honour killing. Rahmi told the police that he had to defend his (family's) honour by killing his daughter. 
The murder o f Fadime shocked Swedish 
society, although it was not the first or only case of 
such crimes in recent years. Immigrants and 
refugees, especially Kurds, feared that the k i l l ing 
would unleash a new wave o f racism and racist 
attacks. The government faced crit icism for failing 
to integrate immigrants and for its pol icy of "double 
standards," i.e., tolerance o f male violence among 
(non-Western) immigrants and promotion o f gender 
equality for the Swedish-born citizens. Swedish 
Kurds condemned the k i l l ing , although there was a 
tendency among some to reduce the murder to an 
isolated event, the problems o f an individual, 
disturbed, person. The media, in Sweden and 
throughout the world, reported the event. In 
Sweden, there was extensive media coverage o f the 
k i l l ing , the funeral o f Fadime, public policy, and the 
clash o f cultures. Some o f the questions that were 
raised are: Is honour k i l l ing part o f Kurdish culture? 
Is honour k i l l ing an Islamic tradition? Was the 
k i l l ing a question o f the conflict o f two cultures? 
What is the role o f the Swedish government? What 
is the role o f race and racism? What can be done to 
prevent honour k i l l ing and other forms of male 
violence against women? 
This article addresses some of the 
questions related to the politics and culture of 
honour k i l l ing . It provides a critique of public 
policy in Sweden, Kurdish nationalist responses, 
and academic theories which play an active role in 
the conflict over this form o f gender violence. The 
purpose of this critique is to contribute to the 
struggle against honour k i l l ing and other forms o f 
violence against women. 
T H E L I F E A N D D E A T H O F F A D I M E : 
A B R I E F A C C O U N T 
Fadime §ahindal was seven years old when 
she moved to Sweden to jo in her father in 1984. 
According to press reports, her parents discouraged 
her from associating with Swedish children in 
school. They told her that she should eventually 
return to Turkey and get married there. Fadime's 
younger brother helped the father in controlling her 
sister, and physically abused her. In 1996, she met 
and fell in love with a Swedish student, Patrik 
Lindesjo, while taking a computer course. When 
Rahmi found out, he reacted by beating the couple. 
Patrik's parents went to see Fadime's parents and 
propose, on behalf o f their son, a marriage 
relationship. Rahmi rejected the offer (Hildebrandt 
2002). 
Fadime had to leave Uppsala, but 
continued to be threatened by her father and 
brother. She turned to the media and talked about 
the oppression of Kurdish girls in Sweden, the 
problems of integration and double standards. On a 
visit to Uppsala, her father spat in her face and 
shouted, "Bloody whore. 1 w i l l beat you to pieces." 
She told the police: "He said I was rejected from the 
family and was not allowed to come back to 
Uppsala. If I did I would never leave the city 
alive." (Ibid) Rahmi was convicted in 1998 of 
making unlawful threats, but was given a suspended 
sentence. Her brother, 17 years old, called her a 
whore during the trial, was found guilty and 
sentenced to probation for one year. The father 
promised the court not to stalk Fadime, who had 
agreed to leave Uppsala. 
Although Fadime had to hide from the 
male members o f the family, she did not remain 
silent. She continued her campaign against "honour 
ki l l ing ," while reminding everyone that she loved 
her father, although he did not know how to treat 
her better. In June 1998, while the couple were 
ready to move into an apartment, Patrik was ki l led 
as his car crashed into a concrete pillar. 
Fadime moved to northern Sweden to 
study sociology, and travelled throughout the 
country to speak about patriarchal violence and the 
situation of immigrant women. In November 2001, 
she addressed the Swedish parliament. In January 
2002, before leaving for Kenya to do field work for 
an M . A . thesis, Fadime decided to visit her mother 
and sisters and say farewell to them. She was at her 
sister's apartment, when at about 10 p.m. on 21 
January, her father knocked at the door, entered the 
apartment, and shot her in the head. Fadime died in 
her mother's arms. 
O n February 4, thousands attended the 
memorial service for Fadime in Uppsala's famous 
fifteenth century Gothic cathedral. Her coffin was 
carried out o f the church by six female family 
members and friends, followed by her mother. One 
of Fadime's sisters was carrying her portrait in front 
of the coffin. The mourners were from very diverse 
backgrounds, including individuals like Crown 
Princess Victor ia , the president o f the parliament 
Birgitta Dahl , the minister o f integration M o n a 
Sahlin, and the highest representative o f Swedish 
Protestant Church, Archbishop Amar. Fadime was 
buried in a private ceremony near the grave o f her 
Swedish partner. There were demonstrations in 
Swedish cities in protest to the k i l l ing o f Fadime 
and violence against women (see, among others, 
Agence France-Press 2002; Wi l l i ams 2002) 
S W E D I S H G O V E R N M E N T RESPONSES 
Sweden carries the image o f a country 
where women are said to be sovereign. However, in 
spite o f the progress made in the democratization o f 
gender relations, patriarchal relations are still 
dominant, and violence against women is an 
indigenous phenomenon. Radical and leftist groups 
and some feminists have in recent years protested 
the government's pol icy o f "double standards." 
About fifteen percent o f the nine mil l ion 
population is non-Nordic or non- White. Most of the 
immigrants from North Afr ica and the Middle East 
settled in Sweden in the 1980s and 1990s. Public 
policy has over the years evolved in favour o f 
respect for minority rights and tolerance o f cultural 
differences. For instance, the legal age o f marriage 
is fifteen for immigrants and eighteen for the rest o f 
the population. Immigrant parents who want to 
cover the bodies o f their children enjoy the right to 
exempt them from swimming courses; parents 
interested in gender segregation enjoy the right to 
remove their children from coeducational sports, 
sex education classes, and field trips. There is no 
protection against forced or arranged marriages. In 
dealing with violence against women, including 
honour k i l l ing , the courts tend to take into account 
the criminals' cultural background. For instance, in 
the case o f a Lebanese Christian father who ki l led 
his young daughter, the court considered culture as 
a mitigating circumstance (Daragahi 2002). 
Although instituted with good intentions, 
this pol icy o f respect for cultural differences 
frustrates the integration of immigrants into 
Swedish society. It treats each immigrant 
community as a monolithic entity, unified by a 
culture o f gender oppression and patriarchal 
violence. This policy shows respect for the 
patriarchal tradition o f immigrants but fails to show 
any respect for their century-long history o f struggle 
for gender equality. But why does a social 
democratic government privilege the patriarchal 
regime o f the immigrant communities, and assist 
them in its reproduction? 
Whatever the dynamics o f policy-making 
in Sweden, the policy on immigrants is informed by 
the theoretical claims o f cultural relativism, which 
encourages ethnic, clan, tribal, national, and 
religious particularisms. This politics does not 
consider immigrants as an integral part o f Swedish 
society, i.e., as citizens bearing the same rights and 
duties. It is not a policy aiming at the civic inclusion 
o f immigrants who come from countries with 
diverse, often non-democratic, polit ical systems. 
Immigrants, even when they are officially granted 
Swedish citizenship, are treated as "foreigners" 
rather than members of a civic nation. This policy 
is, thus, ethnocentric; it is the politics o f an "ethnic 
nation." The "rule o f law" is not universal; it 
depends on one's ethnic belonging. 
Treating patriarchy as the sacred, 
uncontested, essential and inherent constituent o f 
immigrants' gender relations, Sweden's policy lags 
behind the tradition o f liberal feminism, which 
demands the c ivic inclusion o f women through full 
legal equality. This pol icy delegitimizes what 
immigrants possessed in their country o f origin - a 
feminist culture that often dates back to the late 
nineteenth century. It thus undermines the struggle 
o f radical and liberal immigrant activists for the 
democratization of gender relations, and integration 
in Swedish society. This politics combines, neatly, 
ethnocentrism and antifeminism. 
The k i l l ing o f Fadime and the mass protest 
o f immigrants against violence against women 
prompted government officials to reconsider their 
pol icy o f appeasing the conservative element o f 
immigrant communities. W e have yet to see i f there 
w i l l be a radical shift toward treating patriarchy and 
its violence as a problem o f Swedish democracy 
rather than a particularism that immigrants have to 
live with. 
R A C I S M I N C I V I L S O C I E T Y 
Scandinavian societies are known for their 
tolerant, egalitarian, socialist and social democratic 
tendencies and traditions. L i k e other societies, 
however, the political spectrum in Sweden is 
diverse and includes conservative, racist, and fascist 
tendencies. The sharp and sudden increase in 
refugee populations in the 1980s, economic 
difficulties, and the coming to power of 
conservative regimes in some Western countries 
were among the factors that contributed to the rise 
o f intolerance in c iv i l society. Racism had an 
excellent opportunity to come into the open, and 
pose as a viable alternative to civic inclusion. The 
conservative, misogynist component o f immigrants' 
gender relations provides adequate fodder for racists 
in promoting their ethnicist politics. 
After the murder o f Fadime, Swedish 
Kurds and even those in neighbouring countries 
feared racist reprisals. This fear was reported in a 
Finnish paper under the headline "Kurds in Finland 
fear racist reaction to Swedish honour k i l l ing" 
(Helsingin Sanomat, 24 January 2002). Referring to 
the k i l l ing o f Fadime, the head o f the Hels inki Red 
Cross youth shelter, said, "This k ind o f thing does 
not happen any more frequently in immigrant 
families than among Finns" (Ibid.). Racists, 
however, use such events in order to create an 
unbridgeable gap between the indigenous and 
immigrant populations. Even the American movie 
Not Without My Daughter, which depicts 
oppressive gender relations in Iran, has been widely 
used for racist and fascist propaganda against 
non-Whites in Europe and also in South Afr ica 
under the Apartheid regime. 
K U R D I S H R E S P O N S E S : 
T H E H O N O U R O F T H E N A T I O N 
Honour k i l l ing , much like genocide, is a 
crime that few would want to be associated with. It 
tarnishes the image o f the people, nation, country, 
religion and culture that allows it to happen. When 
its occurrence cannot be denied, the damage is 
controlled by reducing it to an isolated event, or the 
problem of the individual killer. For nationalists, 
Kurdish and non-Kurdish, the defence of the honour 
o f the nation has priority over the rights o f women. 
Swedish Kurds condemned the k i l l ing o f 
Fadime, and many used the occasion to protest al l 
forms of violence against women. However, there 
was a tendency to clean up the image of the Kurdish 
nation. If White racists claim that honour k i l l ing is 
an essential part o f Kurdish (or non-Western) 
immigrant culture, Kurdish nationalists and 
Swedish government authorities deny its cultural 
import. 
The debate centred on the killer's 
motivations. A Kurdish website, Kurdish Media , 
raised a question, and asked visitors to "vote" on 
three stated answers (retrieved on 15 February 
2002): 
I think Fadime's murder was mainly motivated by: 
Rel igion 135 30.75 % 
Culture 96 21.87% 
Lost father in Western Culture 183 41.69% 
Other 25 5.69 % 
Total Vote 439 
There is no information on the ethnic or 
religious background of the voters. The poll does, 
however, show a strong inclination to reduce the 
crime to the problems of a father who has failed to 
integrate in a "Western culture." A considerable 
number o f voters also locate the k i l l ing in religion, 
in this case Islam. Although about 22% relate the 
k i l l ing to culture, the dominant tendency is to 
absolve the culture o f responsibility. Concerned 
about racist and media "demonisation o f Kurdish 
men and the stigmatization o f Kurdish culture," a 
Kurdish male student tried to find "a way out o f 
this dilemma": 
I believe that many Kurds find themselves 
in a dilemma and a state of ambivalence in 
the wake of the murder o f Fadime. This is 
a result o f the fact that many Kurds want 
to admit that the murder o f Fadime 
originated from a de facto existing notion 
o f honour; but at the same time 
emphasizing that Kurdish culture as such 
does not sanction and legitimize honour 
kil l ings. 
There is a way out o f this dilemma in my 
view. A t the same time as one admits that 
the murder o f Fadime was a result o f this 
notion o f honour, one can also underline 
the fact that an overpowering majority o f 
Kurds cannot relate to this notion o f 
honour, since Kurdish culture is not 
homogenous. A n d like all other cultures it 
is in a process o f constant change. Only on 
the basis o f an essentialist v iew o f culture 
is it possible to claim that honour k i l l ing is 
an essential attribute o f Kurdish culture -
which many in the Swedish media tend to 
do, implici t ly or explici t ly. (Ahmedi 
2002) 
A non-essentialist v iew o f culture, 
however, does not offer a "way out o f this 
dilemma." That cultures do not consist o f 
immutable essences is rather obvious, and such a 
cla im does not offer insight into the intricacies o f 
violence against women; it also fails to account for 
the competing claims o f nationalists and racists, and 
does not provide a feminist alternative to 
androcentric interpretations. 
T H E P R O D U C T I O N A N D R E P R O D U C T I O N 
O F H O N O U R K I L L I N G : 
H O N O U R K I L L I N G AS C U L T U R E 
"Culture" is one o f the most controversial 
concepts in social sciences. Culture, according to 
one prevalent view, "entails recognition that a l l 
human beings live in a world that is created by 
human beings, and in which they find meaning. 
Culture is the complex everyday world we al l 
encounter and through which we al l move. Culture 
begins at the point when humans surpass whatever 
is simply given in their natural inheritance" (Edgar 
1999:102). Thus, culture consists o f everything that 
is socially rather than biological ly created and 
transmitted. 
Honour k i l l ing has been a recurrent 
phenomenon in the everyday world o f the Kurdish 
people. It is recorded in language, in writing, in oral 
tradition and in f i lm; it has been discussed, 
condemned and resisted. H o w can it be outside 
culture? W e w i l l , however, argue that honour 
k i l l ing should not be reduced to a question o f 
culture (more on this below). 
Kurd ish culture, l ike other Western and 
non-Western cultures, is not a homogeneous or 
monolithic entity. Kurdish gender culture, l ike its 
Western counterparts, consists o f at least two 
conflictual components. One component is 
patriarchy, which is present in folklore, language, 
religion, literature, jokes, manners and, in a word, 
the "l ived experience" o f individuals. In its violent 
forms, this culture is inscribed in the blood o f 
Fadime and countless women who have lost their 
lives in obscurity. 
The other component o f Kurdish culture is 
generally not wel l known, affirmed, valorized, 
confirmed, or promoted: this is the culture o f 
struggle for gender equality. This culture emerged 
in the Kurdish press o f the early 20th century (Kle in 
2001). It was inspired by the liberal feminist and 
women's movements o f the late 19th and early 20th 
century Europe. The first Kurdish women's 
organization was established in 1919. B y the 
mid-20th century, the greatest Kurdish poet o f the 
modern period, Abdul lah Goran (1904-1962), 
strongly condemned honour k i l l ing in one o f his 
poems, Berden usuk " A Tomb-Stone" (see Kurdish 
text and translation in Mojab, forthcoming). In 
1982, the Kurdish film-maker Y i l m a z Gtiney 
strongly condemned patriarchal brutality in his 
movie Yol (Road). 1 Since the 1990s, there has been 
a considerable struggle against honour k i l l ing in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, where the 1988 genocide known as 
Anfal and the two G u l f Wars had destroyed the 
social fabric o f society, and unleashed waves o f 
patriarchal violence. Kurdish feminists in Kurdistan 
and elsewhere have created women's organizations, 
media, shelters, literature, and have organized 
conferences. They have revolted against "their 
own," indigenous, Kurdish, regime of patriarchy. 
O f the two components o f Kurdish gender 
culture, patriarchy and feminism, the former is 
dominant. The two Kurdish nationalist governments 
in Iraqi Kurdistan protect and promote the 
patriarchal culture. Western governments, too, treat 
patriarchy as genuine Kurdish culture. 
Denying or ignoring the existence of a 
culture o f struggle for gender equality in Kurdistan 
or in other non-Western societies is a political 
position. It is patriarchal politics in the sense that it 
denies the universality o f oppression o f women and 
the struggle against it. It is racist in so far as it 
denies the ability o f non-Western, non-White 
women to understand the conditions o f their 
subordination, and ignores their determination to 
resist it. 
It would be more accurate, then, to state 
that the k i l l ing o f Fadime is in line with the dictates 
o f Kurdish patriarchal culture. This culture is 
similar to, i f not the same as, the Western, 
Christian, patriarchal culture which has allowed 
men and women to blow up abortion clinics and 
assassinate doctors who conduct abortions in the 
United States and Canada. One may argue that the 
culture o f honour k i l l ing is traditional, tribal, feudal 
or rural. But k i l l ing women is by no means a 
uniquely Kurdish phenomenon. In the United 
States men k i l l 10 women every day. Whi le these 
murders are not necessarily motivated by "honour," 
the motivations are hardly more humane. The 
decision of a woman to end a relationship prompts 
the male partner to k i l l her: seventy-four percent o f 
these kill ings "occur after the woman has left the 
relationship, filed for divorce or sought a restraining 
order against her partner" (Seager 1997:26). 
Similarly, in Sweden, according to 1989 data, 39 
women are battered daily and one is ki l led every 10 
days by a man known to her (Elman and Eduards 
1991:411). 
The culture of patriarchal violence is, thus, 
universal. Div id ing cultures into violent and 
violence-free is itself a patriarchal myth. It turns 
into an ethnocentric or racist myth when this divide 
is drawn along the lines o f the West and the East. 
Moreover, while the existence of patriarchy as a 
culture cannot be denied, a cultural reductionist 
approach alone does not take us a long way in the 
struggle against male violence. 
H O N O U R K I L L I N G AS T H E E X E R C I S E O F 
G E N D E R P O W E R 
T w o centuries o f feminist intellectual and 
political struggles in the West have imposed on 
nation-states a regime of legal equality between the 
genders. However, legal equality has failed to 
eliminate violence against women. Patriarchy in 
both Kurdish and Western societies is reproduced 
on an hourly and daily basis. It is reproduced by the 
family, the educational system, the state, religion, 
media, music, arts, language, folklore and all other 
social and cultural institutions. Thus, male violence 
against women cannot be reduced to a cultural trait, 
a cultural norm, or a dormant cultural value that 
occasionally pops out with the wrath of a violent 
man who has lost his honour. Neither can it be 
reduced to the psychology of the individual 
killer(s), although this dimension may play a role. 
Honour k i l l ing is a tragedy in which 
fathers and brothers k i l l their most beloved, their 
daughters and sisters. When husbands k i l l their 
wives, in-laws consent and often actively participate 
in the crime. Sometimes mothers and sisters take 
part in the crime or consent to it. K i l l i n g occurs in 
a family system where members are closely tied to 
each other in bonds o f affection, compassion and 
love. Here, affection and brutality coexist in conflict 
and unity. What does this contradiction tell us about 
honour k i l l ing as a form o f the exercise o f male 
power? How can this contradiction be resolved? 
Given the universality and ubiquity of 
male violence - ranging from k i l l ing , to battering to 
rape - it would be more appropriate to look at 
honour k i l l ing and other forms o f violence as means 
for the exercise o f gender power, in this case male 
power. The exercise of gender power is intertwined 
with the exercise of class and political powers. A 
learned Kurdish mullah in the mid-19th century had 
a good grasp of honour k i l l ing as the exercise of 
gender power. Writ ing an essay on Kurdish 
Manners and Customs in 1859-60, M e l a Mehmud 
Bayezidi argued that tribal and rural Kurdish 
women were as free as the women o f Europe; they 
could freely associate with men. He noted, 
however, that women could never engage in 
pre-marital or extra-marital relationships with a 
stranger. I f they did they would be ki l led without 
hesitation and with impunity. N o one would 
question the killers. It was a shame on the family 
that could be cleaned only through murder; it was 
also a shame on the community, the village, the 
tribe, the neighbours and the neighbourhood. The 
community participated in the k i l l ing by expecting 
it to happen, by endorsing it, and by casting out the 
family when it failed to k i l l the woman. Me la 
Mehmud noted that the purpose o f the k i l l ing was to 
instil fear in women so that they would guard their 
modesty and chastity (see Mojab, forthcoming). 
Unfamiliar with feminist theory, M e l a Mehmud's 
understanding o f the exercise of gender power was 
nevertheless more advanced than contemporary 
"feminist" reductions o f honour k i l l ing to "practice" 
(see below). The learned mullah felt free to discuss 
honour k i l l ing , as a Kurdish "custom and manner," 
in al l its brutality. 
If honour k i l l ing is a form o f the exercise 
of gender power, what can be done to eliminate it 
under the existing regimes o f gendered political 
power? What are the dynamics o f the production 
and reproduction of honour k i l l ing in our times, in 
Kurdistan and in the West? 
W e realize that it is not easy to dislodge let 
alone eliminate honour k i l l ing and other forms o f 
violence in the short run or in the absence of a 
radical transformation of the male-centred social 
and economic order. We argue, however, that (1) 
the k i l l ing o f Fadime was not an isolated case or an 
abnormality; to see the murder as an anomaly is a 
convenient excuse for non-action; (2) a host o f 
factors are involved in the reproduction of violence 
against women; (3) all o f us are involved in one 
way or another i n a l lowing this regime of male 
brutality to reproduce itself, and (4) much can be 
done in order to put an end to honour ki l l ing. We 
w i l l first look at the factors that contribute to the 
reproduction o f the crime. 
K U R D I S H N A T I O N A L I S M 
Kurdish nationalists have promoted the 
myth of the uniqueness of Kurdish women: like 
some Western observers o f Kurdish society, they 
c la im that Kurdish women enjoy more freedom 
compared with their Arab, Persian and Turkish 
sisters. Whatever the status of women in Kurdish 
society, Kurdish nationalism, like other nationalist 
movements, has been patriarchal, although it has 
also paid lip service to the idea of gender equality. 
For Kurdish nationalisms, nation building requires 
the unity of genders, classes, regions, dialects, and 
alphabets. They consistently relegate the 
emancipation of women to the future, i.e., after the 
emancipation o f the nation. However, after Kurdish 
nationalism achieved state power in Iraq after the 
1991 G u l f War, its record in matters of gender 
equality has been bleak. Let's briefly look at this 
experience. 
The Kurdish people have lived, since the 
late 1870s, in what Mark Levene (1998) has 
characterized as a "zone o f genocide." In this zone 
(Eastern Anatolia comprising Kurdistan), the 
Ottoman state conducted genocide of the Armenian 
people in l915 and, together with its successor, the 
Republic o f Turkey, subjected the Assyrian and 
Kurdish peoples to numerous campaigns o f 
genocide and ethnic cleansing. The Ba'th regime of 
Iraq ensured that this zone would continue to 
operate in spite o f being divided between Iraq and 
Turkey in 1918. N o less than ten thousand Kurdish 
villages were destroyed in Iraqi Kurdistan between 
1975 and 1991 and in Turkey between 1984 and 
2000. 
The zone of genocide continues to be an 
active zone o f war. These wars have destroyed the 
social, economic and cultural fabric o f Kurdish 
society. They have unleashed waves o f male 
violence against women. This explains, at least in 
part, why there are more incidents of honour k i l l ing 
among the Kurds o f Iraq and Turkey compared with 
the Kurds o f Iran, whose experience o f war has 
been less devastating. 
In the aftermath of the U.S. - led G u l f War 
o f 1991, when the Iraqi army attacked Kurdistan, 
millions o f Iraqi Kurds escaped into the mountains 
in March and A p r i l . The U . S . , U . K . and France 
created a no-fly zone, a "safe haven," in order to 
return the refugees. Two major parties, the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party o f Iraq ( K D P ) and the 
Patriotic Union o f Kurdistan ( P U K ) , which had 
been fighting the Iraqi government for decades, 
created the Regional Government of Kurdistan in 
1992. This was a de facto Kurdish state with its 
parliament and administrative structure. However, 
in the course o f parliamentary elections, male and 
female voters were segregated at the voting centers. 
S ix o f the 105 members o f the parliament were 
women (5.7%). The two parties engaged in an 
internal war in 1994, which continued intermittently 
until 1996. Fai l ing to resolve their conflict, they 
formed, by 1999, their o w n separate 
administrations. In the context o f unprecedented 
increase in honour k i l l ing and women's suicides, 
they adopted Iraqi law which did not criminalize 
honour k i l l ing , and was lenient on the punishment 
of killers. Faced with opposition from women, the 
two parties, especially K D P , have tried to justify 
honour ki l l ing as a Kurdish and Islamic tradition. In 
2000, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan issued two 
resolutions aimed at revoking Iraqi law, and 
criminalizing honour k i l l ing . The resolutions, which 
have the status of law in the absence of a legislative 
organ, have remained on paper in so far as the 
government has neither the w i l l nor the power to 
enforce them. 
I f the K D P government has persistently 
ignored the demand for gender equality and for the 
criminalization o f honour k i l l ing and the P U K 
government paid only lip service to them, they have 
both bowed to the demands o f a handful o f mullahs 
and their Iranian overlords. Kurdish mullahs, who 
never aspired to theocratic governance, now 
demand the Islamization of gender relations, and the 
subordination o f Kurdish women according to the 
dictates o f Islam. Financed and organized by the 
Iranian theocracy, some Kurdish Islamic groups aim 
at establishing a theocracy. Not surprisingly at all , 
Kurdish leaders who were secular before 1979, now 
entertain Islam and Islamists. The two Kurdish 
governments have opened more mosques than 
women's shelters. In fact, they have not initiated 
any women's shelters. Even worse, the P U K 
government launched an armed attack on a women's 
shelter operated by an opposition political party (the 
shelter operated by the Independent Women's 
Organization in Sulemani). 
Kurdish nationalism, in or out o f power, 
has generally entertained patriarchy and 
legitimatized its violence; it has little respect for the 
Kurdish tradition of struggle for gender equality. 
After ten years o f self-rule in the no-fly zone of 
Iraqi Kurdistan, the women's press, consisting of 
only a few publications, is dwarfed by the bulky 
nationalist periodicals produced in the two major 
cities o f Sulemani and Hewler. Not a single work of 
feminist theory has been translated into Kurdish. 
The text o f the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
( C E D A W , adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 1979) has not yet appeared in 
Kurdish. The priority of most Kurdish intellectuals, 
males and females, is not opposition to gender 
inequality. 
T H E N A T I O N - S T A T E S IN T H E M I D D L E 
E A S T 
The states that rule over the Kurds do not 
criminalize honour k i l l ing , or are lenient on 
punishing killers. Iranian law provides for the 
execution of lesbians and gays, and the stoning to 
death of married adulterers. 
These states deny citizens the right to life 
in so far as they practice capital punishment as a 
normal, unproblematic, indispensable means o f 
governance. Turkey, which aspires to become a full 
member of the European Union , has refused to 
abolish capital punishment for all crimes (a 
requirement for membership). Not only does it 
engage in extrajudicial k i l l ing , Turkey reserves the 
right to k i l l citizens on charges of secessionism. 
This legal framework w i l l allow more genocides 
and ethnic cleansing. Thus, Turkey wants to 
become an E U member while reserving what Leo 
Kuper (1981: 161-85) called the sovereign state's 
"right to genocide." 
The coming to power o f the theocratic 
Islamic regime in Iran unleashed waves of 
state-sponsored male terrorism against women. A l l 
M u s l i m states, from Alger ia and Morocco in the 
West to Pakistan in the East, Islamized gender 
relations by introducing more Islamic shari'a into 
their legal system. A century of struggle for the 
separation of state and religion came under attack. 
The idea of separation of the powers o f state and 
religion was branded by Iranian theocracy as a 
Western conspiracy against Islam. Women were the 
first targets o f theocratic terrorism in Iran and, later, 
Afghanistan. M a n y Kurdish nationalist leaders, l ike 
the states in the region, embraced Islam. If theocrats 
have promoted stoning to death and honour k i l l ing 
as Islamic institutions, some Kurdish leaders have 
endorsed male violence as a national tradition. 2 
E U R O P E A N S T A T E S 
There are now sizeable Kurdish 
communities in Europe, especially in Germany, 
Britain, France, Sweden and a number of other 
countries. Whi le these states readily declared the 
Kurdistan Workers Party, P K K , a terrorist or 
criminal organization, they have not criminalized 
male terrorism against women. The policy o f 
respect for cultural differences is a policy of respect 
for patriarchal power. However, we have learned 
from two centuries o f democratic development that 
group "identity" and culture should not be the basis 
for the exercise o f state power. H o w can one have 
any respect for any culture that endorses violence 
against women? The policy of respect for male 
brutality has no respect for the anti-patriarchal 
culture o f the Kurds. Is it a matter o f accident that 
there are always enough financial resources for the 
army and for war, but there is little investment in 
promoting feminist knowledge, the culture and 
politics of gender equality, the provision o f shelters 
and other resources for terrorized women, Kurdish 
and non-Kurdish? Devoting the costs o f a single 
Chieftain tank or a single Mirage aircraft to 
women's shelters, support for battered women and 
promotion o f feminist knowledge w i l l produce 
tangible results in promoting women's rights. Is it 
an accident that governments began the new century 
with $798 bi l l ion on military spending (2000 
figure)? W h y is this machinery o f man-made 
violence so wel l funded? 
Public policy in Europe and in North 
Amer ica has responded to some extent to academic 
debates on culture, identity, and difference. W e are 
referring to academic research and theorization on 
the merits o f diversity, difference and cultural 
relativism. Whi le Western governments have taken 
some steps forward (e.g., admitting gender violence 
as a criterion for refugee status) it is not difficult to 
see the steps backward. W e w i l l deal with these 
briefly. 
T H E A C A D E M I C E N V I R O N M E N T 
Our knowledge about violence against 
women, especially in the West, has improved 
vis ibly in the last two decades. The monthly 
academic journal Violence Against Women has 
made an important contr ibut ion to the 
understanding of the problem. In dealing with 
honour k i l l ing , however, recent Western social 
theory has played a rather negative role. We are 
talking about theories o f cultural relativism, politics 
o f identity, post-structuralism, postmodernism and 
other post- positions. 
Since the late 1980s, this brand o f 
thinking, now dominant in academe and fashionable 
in media and popular culture, treats difference as the 
main constituent of the social world. Human beings, 
in this construction o f the world, are all different, 
with their diverse and particular "identities." There 
is little, i f any, common bond between human 
beings. The politics and everyday life o f human 
beings are shaped by identities which separate them 
from all other human beings. In this world o f 
particularized individuals, cultures, peoples, or 
nations, patriarchy is not universal, and gender 
oppression is too particular to be the target o f 
struggle o f women and men even within a single 
country. A t the same time, the concept of difference 
replaces the concept o f domination. The world, in 
this view, is not divided into powerless and 
powerful blocs. Every individual, every woman, 
wields power. Power is not hierarchically 
organized; there may be a "centre" and a "margin" 
of power but there are no relationships o f 
domination and subordination. 
This brand o f theorization emphasizes 
respect for cultural difference. Although its 
advocates oppose violence, they prefer to remain 
silent about it, especially when it is perpetrated by 
"others" whom they cannot judge due to cultural 
differences. There is, thus, an attempt to isolate 
honour k i l l ing from the patriarchal culture of the 
society that generates it. This is done by, among 
other things, reducing honour k i l l ing to a "practice," 
i.e., an individual behaviour not rooted in patriarchy 
as a regime or system (see below). Labell ing the 
crime as a "practice" relieves the academic 
specialist from the burden of criticizing culture and 
religion. 
Some o f these academics are feminists, 
who teach about gender relations in the Middle 
East. They try to avoid the neocolonialist or 
Orientalist trap o f treating Midd le Eastern women 
as backward, ignorant, illiterate, over-oppressed, 
and passive. This is surely a noble commitment, and 
a very honourable undertaking. However, in trying 
to distance themselves from "neocolonialist 
representations of Middle Eastern women," they 
tend to keep silent on the atrocities committed 
against women by "their own" men, "their own" 
religion, and "their own" culture. Let us provide an 
example. In a workshop on "Teaching about Honor 
Ki l l ings and other Sensitive Topics in Middle East 
Studies: 'Honor K i l l i n g , ' 'Female Genital Mutilation 
or Circumcision, ' 'Vei l ing, ' and 'Women and 
Shari'ah'," held at the University o f California at 
Santa Barbara in March 2000, a number o f 
academic feminists discussed their dilemma: how to 
speak about such "sensitive topics" without falling 
into the neocolonialist trap? One participant noted 
that she had pursued a policy o f silence on female 
circumcision. A reviewer of the workshop reported: 
She explained that her strategy for 
responding to questions about [female] 
circumcision had changed over time. First, 
her policy was silence. She would say, "I 
don't have anything to say about this 
issue," or "I would rather talk about other 
issues, l ike poverty, neocolonialism, and 
so on... and their impact on women, rather 
than becoming part o f the problem." But 
she said she realized that while she was 
choosing silence, others, who might not be 
w e l l informed on the issue o f 
circumcision, were taking over the 
discourse. She realized then that she had to 
respond. She added that often she 
encourages students not to write about 
circumcision until they know more about 
it, or until they talk at least to one woman 
who has been circumcised. But she 
expressed concern that this strategy might 
involve silencing her students. (Naber 
2000: 20) 
In her review o f two documentaries on 
honour k i l l ing (Crimes of Honour and Our Honour 
and His Glory), feminist anthropologist Mary 
Elaine Hegland wrote: 
The topic of honor k i l l ing , like 
clitoridectomy, spousal abuse, infanticide, 
elder neglect, rape, war, capital 
punishment, and pre-marital sex among 
other practices condoned by some groups 
but condemned by others, presents 
dilemmas to anthropologists, feminist 
s c h o l a r s a n d o t h e r s . S h o u l d 
anthropologists be apologists or advocates 
for their research group or social analysts? 
Should one's role be researcher or activist? 
(Hegland 2000:15; italics added) 
One approach to the dilemma was to talk 
about the "sensitive topics" but to contextualize 
them by informing the students that these problems 
are not a Middle Eastern phenomenon; they are also 
found in the West, now and in the past. This 
pedagogical "strategy," according to some, w i l l 
distance the instructor from neocolonialist 
"representations" or "discourses." The participants 
in the workshop decided to talk about "sensitive 
topics" as a "strategy" to handle a dilemma 
(apologists/advocates or social analysts). This is a 
pedagogical device to protect the instructor from a 
perceived threat or a real (ideological and political) 
fear. We believe that it is indeed crucial to relate 
Middle Eastern male violence to its Western 
counterparts, though not for the reasons stated (i.e., 
not for the purpose o f protecting the instructor from 
accusations of racism, Orientalism, etc.). Rather, 
violence against women in the West should be 
mentioned because patriarchy and male violence are 
universal. However, we argue that this "strategy" is 
not adequate. It does not allow a serious departure 
from neocolonialism. A radical departure requires 
the abandoning o f the epistemological and 
theoretical dictates o f agnosticism and cultural 
relativism. It requires the cultural relativist to 
overcome the fear o f recognizing the universality of 
patriarchal violence. Taking this step, however, 
demands an appreciation of the dialectics o f 
universals and particulars - each regime o f 
patriarchy is particular (Kurdish patriarchy is 
different from Italian patriarchy), however, 
patriarchies form a universal regime in so far as 
they perpetrate, without exception, physical and 
symbolic violence against women (Mojab 1998). 
In the (neo)colonialist world view, the 
women o f the Midd le East constitute an anomaly, 
an exception, or abnormality: unlike Western 
women, they are seen as bl ind followers of Islamic 
patriarchy. They are, according to neocolonialist 
thought, without their own history since they do not 
struggle for equality or liberation. 
Academic feminists o f the cultural 
relativist persuasion, too, fail to appreciate a century 
of Middle Eastern women's struggle against 
patriarchy. Women's struggle against patriarchy is, 
for them, another "sensitive topic." They may know 
about a century of women's press; a century o f 
advocacy of women's rights; a century of writing; a 
century o f poetry; a century o f organizing; and a 
century of repression o f women's movements by 
both secular and Islamic regimes. Ye t talking about 
this history is "sensitive" because cultural 
relativists, l ike Islamic fundamentalists, believe that 
Middle Eastern women's movements are inspired by 
Western women's struggles. Appreciating this 
history is difficult for these academic feminists 
because, in their opposition to neocolonialist 
"discourses," they often side with nationalists, 
Islamists and nativists. They privilege the nativist 
position, which rejects feminism as a "derivative 
discourse." They treat feminism as a "Western 
discourse" that is not compatible with Islam and the 
native culture. They do not want to contaminate 
M i d d l e Eastern women's movements with the 
struggles of the women o f the West, with 
modernity, with Enlightenment. Some secular 
academic "feminists" have actively contributed to 
the construction of a " M u s l i m woman identity." 3 
It is understandable, then, why academics 
in the cultural relativist position prefer silence about 
"sensitive topics"; and when they have to talk about 
honour k i l l ing , they reduce the institutionalized 
crime to a "practice" that has nothing to do with 
culture, Islam or the exercise o f male power. This 
position does not start from the reality o f male 
brutality against women. It legitimizes the violent 
gender politics o f a tiny minority of the population, 
the self-appointed clergy. It imposes the politics o f 
this tiny group on the entire nation; it authenticates 
this violent gender politics but delegitimizes a 
century of secular feminist movements in the 
M i d d l e East. A s a result, cultural relativists fail to 
condemn, without any reservation or condition, 
honour k i l l ing or stoning adulterers to death. They 
are concerned about being labelled "racist," 
"Orientalist," or "neocolonialist." 
Anthropologists are equipped with 
conceptual tools for exempting culture and religion 
in the "practice" o f honour k i l l ing . In her review o f 
the two documentaries on honour k i l l ing , Hegland 
writes: 
The two videos clearly differ in level o f 
professionalism, cultural knowledge, and 
analytical sophistication. Crimes of 
Honour promotes a more balanced, 
contextualized, analytical treatment of 
honor k i l l ing and the f i lm team and 
activists portrayed take a more moderate, 
accommodating stance. Since the action is 
blamed on specific conditions rather than 
the society, culture, or tradition as a 
whole, the f i lm provides hope that better 
conditions w i l l serve to combat the 
practice. 
Crimes of Honour is less strident in tone. 
Activists are angry about honor k i l l ing and 
the lack of effective means to protect 
threatened women, but they do not 
condemn culture, tradition, and religion as 
responsible... (p. 16) 
But why should any one who opposes 
honour k i l l i n g "take a more moderate, 
accommodating stance" toward this crime and 
those who perpetrate it? What are "better 
conditions?" What "better conditions" can deter 
criminals from perpetrating the crime? W h y should 
one hesitate to condemn the culture, tradition and 
religion that sanctions violence against women? 4 
Anthropologists interested in absolving 
religion and culture treat honour ki l l ing as a 
practice. "Practice theory" claims that individual 
behaviour (e.g., Rahmi's decision to k i l l Fadime) 
does not derive from rules, norms, culture, 
rule-bound traditions, systems or structures. Even 
when the existence of structures is not denied, they 
are not seen as constraining the mind or behaviour 
of the individual (Barnard 2000: 142-43). While 
practice theory has not made a major breakthrough 
in the debate on structure and agency, its 
application to the case of honour k i l l ing undermines 
feminist struggles against this crime. 
P R O S P E C T S 
We have tried to look at some of the 
systemic elements that allow for the production and 
reproduction o f male violence, especially honour 
k i l l ing among the Kurds. W e have argued that 
honour k i l l ing cannot be reduced to the 
psychological problems of individual killers. 
Honour-based violence is a social, patriarchal 
institution, which reproduces the supremacy of the 
male gender. In our time, a host o f factors, ranging 
from religion to public policy to media to academic 
theories, are playing a role in the perpetuation of 
honour k i l l ing . 
We emphasize that education, and 
conscious, organized, intervention in oppressive 
gender relations w i l l in the long run constrain the 
perpetration of this crime. We are talking about 
feminist in tervent ion. However , feminist 
consciousness, feminist knowledge, and feminist 
culture themselves are under attack. In part because 
feminist knowledge has effectively challenged all 
previous knowledge systems as androcentric 
undertakings, it has been subjected to vilifications 
in Western media and popular culture and even 
within its own realm in academia (Hammer 2002). 
If non-Western nativists, Islamists and nationalists 
reject feminism as a "derivative discourse," 
conservatives in the West also refuse to include 
feminism in their "canon" of Western civilization 
and culture. This is where the Western colonialist, 
new and old, and the non-Western nationalist, 
nativist , Islamist, and cultural relativist 
inadvertently jo in forces. That also explains why 
the Holy See, Saudi Arabia and Iran joined forces in 
the Bei j ing Conference of 1995. Indeed, 
anti-feminism is probably stronger in the West than 
in the East. There is a hunger for feminist 
consciousness in non-Western societies. This is the 
case in spite o f the fact that a host of theories 
ranging from post-modernism to identity politics to 
cultural relativism encourages the women of the 
world to go under the banner of their tribes, ethnic 
groups, nations, religions, and communities. 
A s for Kurdish women, they are a 
potentially powerful force in international women's 
movements. They constitute the hub of all 
contradictions in this globalizing world. Subjected 
to the brutal violence o f the nation-states of the 
Middle East and their genocides and ethnic 
cleansing projects, suffering from the violence o f 
"their own" national patriarchy, and dispersed 
throughout the world, Kurdish women are in a 
unique position to distance themselves from 
male-centred ethnic, nationalist, and religious 
politics, and to jo in forces with feminist movements 
which do not compromise with patriarchy. Women 
and feminist movements are international in 
character; they are present all over the world and 
resist a worldwide regime of patriarchal oppression. 
However, they are not organized as an international 
movement. Kurdish women and Kurdish women's 
studies are at the margins of this international 
movement (Mojab 2001; Mojab and Hassanpour, 
forthcoming). There is considerable solidarity, 
although it is not readily accessible due to the 
organizational fragmentation of the movement. 
The institution of the state in the countries 
that rule over the Kurds in the Midd le East is 
neither c iv i l nor civi l ized. One cannot expect an end 
to honour k i l l ing in a state which has no respect for 
any of its citizens' right to life, and freely exercises 
the "right to genocide." We believe that the struggle 
against honour k i l l ing is inseparable from the 
struggle for democratic rule. It is also a struggle for 
separation of state and religion; a struggle to deny 
the two Kurdish governments in Iraqi Kurdistan the 
right to impose a theocratic order on the Kurds. It is 
a struggle to push the two Kurdish governments to 
adopt and implement, without any reservations, the 
U N Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. C E D A W is an 
important document that Kurdish feminists can use 
to promote a democratic gender culture. Are these 
demands rooted in European Enlightenment? Our 
answer is, without hesitation, in the affirmative. Are 
these demands Western in origin? Definitely, yes. 
A n d there is nothing wrong with this. Peoples in the 
East have struggled for these demands for no less 
than a century. The demands are, thus, universal. 
We emphasize again that in the West, too, there was 
extensive opposition to these demands. Today, too, 
the extreme right and Christian fundamentalists, 
much like their Islamic counterparts, continue to 
oppose feminism and the separation o f state and 
religion. The lines are, thus, not drawn on ethnic 
grounds but rather on political principles. 
Western feminism has been justifiably 
critiqued for its ethnocentrism and racism. 
However, contrary to the claims of nationalists and 
nativists, there is a rich tradition of anti-racism in 
the West, especially in its feminist movements. 
Indeed, nowhere in the non-Western world can one 
find a tradition o f anti-racism that is as rich as that 
o f the West. Kurdish women in the West are in an 
ideal position to draw on and contribute to these 
traditions o f anti-racism and internationalism. In 
Kurdistan, women are subjected to the harshest 
forms o f national and gender oppression. In its 
brutality, national oppression overshadows gender 
violence. However, Kurdish women have already 
made their own history by resisting their national 
patriarchy. 
Tragically, Fadime w i l l not be the last one 
in the long list o f victims of male violence. More 
lives w i l l be lost, often in obscurity, in Kurdistan 
and elsewhere. However, her life w i l l not be lost in 
vain i f we turn our anger and frustration into a 
struggle to challenge this brutality in all its 
manifestations and by all means possible. 
E N D N O T E S 
1. A central story in the film is the chaining of a woman by her in-laws in their village bam on suspicion of infidelity. She is delivered 
to her husband when he returns to the village after taking a leave from prison. Many Turkish nationalists did not hesitate to condemn 
the film for offering a negative image of Turkey, and the film was banned by the government until 1993. In his review of the film, Roger 
Scruton celebrated the film for portraying "the Turkish army as a peace-keeping force imposing its rough justice upon a country torn 
by faction." However, the reviewer did not extend his defence of the Turkish army to women, whose right to life is denied in the movie 
and in Kurdish/Turkish society. Scruton resented Giiney's condemnation of violence against women by claiming that "he is unable to 
contain his outrage at the resulting sufferings of women, and unable to share Yasar Kemal's countervailing sense of the support which 
women receive, in the form of unbreakable domestic affection" (Scruton 1983). Honour killers have usually made no secret that they 
love their victims, and their decision to kill is, in large part, imposed on them by tradition, religion, and culture, as well as the approval 
and expectations of family, kin, tribe, neighbourhood, and village. 
2. The leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the formerTaliban regime in Afghanistan would be offended if they are told that their 
laws (in the case of Iran), shari'a (in the case of the Taliban) and fatwas, which have sanctioned honour killing and stoning adulterers 
to death, have nothing to do with Islam or are un-Islamic. Equally offended will be "some of the top scholars in the Muslim world" who 
have issued hundreds of misogynist Islamic Fatawa Regarding Women (Abdul-Aziz al-Musnad 1996). Many Islamic governments have 
not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the ones that have ratified it have 
entered significant reservations, which reject the Convention's requirement that all discrimination in marriage and family relations be 
eliminated. Some of these governments have justified their reservations by arguing that these articles of CEDAW are in conflict with 
shari'a (UNIFEM and UNICEF 1998; Banani 1998; Tay 1998; Nasser 1998). One may argue that these positions are based on particular 
readings of Islam; however, the claim that they are un-Islamic is a political and ideological position that does not promote the struggle 
against patriarchal gender relations. 
4. An extensive and rich literature in all Middle Eastern languages since the late nineteenth century critiques the oppression of women, 
and unreservedly condemns violence against women. This literature includes journalistic essays, poetry, novels, short stories, cartoons, 
letters to the editor, satire, and academic research (see, among others, Afary 1996 and Afary et al 2000 on Iran; Brummett 2000 on 
Ottoman Empire; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987, on contemporary Pakistan). Much like Enlightenment thinkers, reformers in the "Muslim 
world" critiqued the culture, tradition, and religion of oppression including the clergy and their versions of Islam. Today's feminists of 
a cultural relativist tendency move in the opposite direction by denying that Islam and culture play any role in honour killing, stoning 
adulterers to death, or executing gays and lesbians; not only do they deny such responsibilities, they do their best to protect Islam and 
Middle Eastern cultures from any critique. To give one example, another reviewer of Crimes of Honour, happily tells her readers, "This 
film also must be praised for making clear that honor killings have nothing to do with Islam...," and concludes, mournfully, that "this 
film will do nothing to endear viewers to Arab culture or to Islam. And this depiction constitutes the dilemma for teachers who might 
want to use this film in their classroom. Indeed, once this Pandora's Box has been opened in the classroom, every other issue will pale 
into the background. Guaranteed" (Doumato 2000: 296-97). 
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